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JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON CRI1ilNAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
CHESTER

A

QUESTION

G.

VERNIER AND

OF PENALTY IN THE UNITED

ELMER

A. WiLcox.

STATES COURT FOR CHINA.

The United States of Anmerica v. Peter A. Grimes. Criminal action No.
87; original paper filed at Shanghai, March 9, 1914. Edward H. Murray, acting clerk of court.
Syllabus.
1. The jurisdiction of this court to try and sentence one charged with
an offense defined by the common law or by the codes of the District of
Columbia or Alaska is now well established.
2. The minimum penalty should not ordinarily be imposed for a second
offense of the same character.
William S. Fleming, Esq., Special United States Attorney for the Government.
Stirling Fessenden, Esq., for the defendant.
Judgment and Sentence.
Lobingier, J.
The accused pleads guilty to an information charging him with forgery
of a check for fifty dollars;, Mexican currency. The offense charged was one
at common law (19 Cyc. 1370) and is also such by the codes of the District
of Columbia (Sec. 843) and Alaska (Sec. 76) which latter under the decision
of the Court of Appeals (Biddle v. U. S., 156 Fed. Rep. 579) and of this
court (U. S v. Grimsinger, October 30, 1912) are applicable here. There is
accordingly no question as to our jurisdiction and the procedure is settled by
the decision of the Supreme Court in Ross v. McIntyre, 140 U. S. 453. The
plea of guilty, therefore, leaves only the penalty to be considered.
Counsel for the accused asks for the minimum punishment because his
client has pleaded guilty and by reason also of the comparitively small amount
obtained by means of the forged check. These are considerations which would
ordinarily have weight and, in the absence of countervailing circumstances,
might justify the leniency sought.
It appears, however, from a showing made by counsel for the government upon the prisoner's first appearance for sentence, and admitted by the
latter, that so late as August 10th last he was discharged from San Quentin
Prison, California, after serving a sentence of one year for this identical
offense under the name of John H. Rogers. As the crime to which he now
pleads guilty was, according to the information, committed on December .6,
it will be seen that he was repeating his former offense within four months
of his discharge. Moreover, it even appears from the records of the Consular
Court that the accused has been there convicted of, and has already served
sentences of two and four weeks respectively for somewhat similar offenses
(obtaining money under false pretenses) the first committed as early as
October 4, 1913, and the second on December 9. Leaving out of account the
fact that another information charging forgery on December 8 is pending
against the accused, and by agreement of both counsel has been allowed to
stand over (though this it seems may properly be considered in fixing the
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penalty, State v. I'Vise, 32 Oreg. 280, 50 Pac. 800) it sufficiently appears from
the admitted facts already reviewed that he is not only no novice in crime,
but that a penalty such as is now suggested has had little or no deterrent effect
upon him.
Now the deterrent effect of punishment is the element which should be
most controlling in determinging its duration and severity. As expressed
by the father of modern penology, Beccaria, "The end of punishment is nothing else than to prevent the repetition of crime.' The present day theory of
penalties, in other words, is preventive and not vindictive; but a penalty
which leaves so little impression upon the offender that he repeats the offense
within a few weeks cannot accurately be termed "preventive"'
Indeed the fact that the accused is a second offender at all would seem
to deprive him of the benefits of the minimum penalty. In the Codes of Civil
Law countries, (e. g., Spanish Penal Code, Art. 10 (17, 18)) that is an
aggravating circumstance which automatically raises the penalty and in AngloAmerican jurisdictions it is an element to be considered in exercising the
court's discretion. As was well said by Chief Justice Clark in State v. Wilson,
121 N. C. 650, 28 S. E. Rep. 417:
"Such matters ought justly and properly to be considered, as well
as, on the other hand, a defendant's previous good character in lightening
the sentence to be imposed. In England and some of the states of this
country there is an "Habitual Criminals Act," which requires heavier sentences for such offenders. Whart. Cr. P1. (9th Ed.) 934; 1 McLain, Cr.
Law 28; Moore v. Missouri, 159 U. S.673, 16. Sup. Ct. 179."
The minimum penalty provided for this offense by both of the codes
above cited is imprisonment for one year but the maximum in the first is
twenty years and ten in the second. And while in view of the decision of
this court in U. S. v. Grimshiger, supra, these periods may not be controlling
we are of the opinion, in the light of all the circumstances, that a term of
three years would be the least that would serve to deter the accused or to
affort a warning to others of like tendencies.
It has been suggested that tle accused may be suffering from some form
of criminal mania; but clearly this does not lessen the necessity of incarceration though it may require a special method of treatment during .the
period thereof and this is meanwhile recommended to. the consideration of the
prison authorities.
The defendant is accordingly sentenced to imprisonment for a term of
three years to be served in the jail for American convicts in China at Shanghai,
China, until provision is made by the government for his transfer to some
prison in the United States; and it is directed that during the whole of said
term he be employed at some useful labor. He is further adjudged to pay
the costs of this prosecution.
By the Court, CIHARLES S. LOBINGIER, Judge, Shanghai, China, March 9, 1914.
CONSPRACY.

United States v. Foster, et al., 211 Fed. 205. Conspiracy by postmaster to.
Defraud Government. A conspiracy to secure for a postmaster a larger salary by
purchasing at his office a large quantity of stamps for use outside the territory
served by such office was not a conspiracy to defraud the United States, since
as the statute makes the postmaster's salary dependent upon the gross receipts
without excluding receipts from such sales, the postmaster was legally entitled
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to the salary which it was the object of the alleged conspiracy to secure, and
a conspiracy to obtain by improper methods what one is legally entitled to
is not punishable as a conspiracy to defraud.
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW.

Garland v. State of Washington, 34 Sup. Ct. Reptr. 456. Necessity of
arraignment and plea--"Due process of law."
A conviction upon a second and amended information after a prior conviction under the original information had been set aside and a new trial
granted was not wanting in the due process of law guaranteed by U. S.
Const., 14th Amend., because no arraignment or plea was had upon the second information, where, without raising that specific objection before trial,
the accused has made certain objections to such information, and was put
to a trial thereon before a jury in all respects as though he had entered a
formal plea of not guilty.
In answer to the argument that the United States Supreme Court had
held the contrary in Crain v. United States, 162 U. S. 625, the court, by
Justice Day, said in part:
"Technical objections of this character were undoubtedly given much
more weight formerly than they are now. Such rulings originated in that
period of English history when the accused was entitled to few rights in the
presentation of his defense, when he could not be represented by counsel,
nor heard upon his own oath, and when the punishment of offenses, even of
a trivial character, was of a severe and often of a shocking nature. Under
that system the courts were disposed to require that the technical forms and
methods of procedure should be fully complied with. But with improved
methods of procedure and greater privileges to the accused, any reason for
such strict adherence to the mere formalities of trial would seem to have
passed away, and we think that the better opinion, when applied to such a
situation as now confronts us, was expressed in the dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Peckham, speaking for the minority of the court in the Crain case,
when he said (page 649) :
"'Here the defendant could not have beeh injured by an inadvertence of
that nature. He ought to be held to have waived that which under the circumstances, would have been a wholly unimportant formality. A waiver
ought to be conclusively implied where the parties had proceeded as if defendant had been duly arraigned, and a formal plea of not guilty had been
interposed, and where there was no objection made on account of its absence
until, as in this case, the record was brought to this court for review. It
would be inconsistent with the due administration of justice to permit a
defendant under such circumstances to lie by, say nothing as to such an objection, and then for the first time urge it in this court.'
"Holding this view, notwithstanding our reluctance to overrule former
decisions of this court, we now are constrained to hold that the technical
enforcement of formal rights in criminal procedure sustained in the Crain
case is no longer required in the prosecution of offenses under present systems
of law, and so far as that case is not in accord with the views herein expressed, it is necessarily overruled."
Riley v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 34 Sup. Ct. Reptr. 469. Hours
of Employment-Freedom of Contract. The employment of women for more
than ten hours in any one day, or more than 56 hours a week, in any manu-
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facturing or mechanical establishment, may be "forbidden as is done by Mass.
Laws 1909, chap. 514, sec. 48, which makes the exception that a different.
apportionment of the hours may be made for the sole purpose of making
a shorter day's work for one day of the week, without infringing the liberty
of contract assured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
Palsone v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 34 Sup. Ct. Repr. 28.1. Possession of Firearms by Aliens. The legislative assumption that unnaturalized
foreign-born residents are peculiarly a source of danger to wild life cannot
be said to be so unwarranted as to invalidate, as denying the equal protection
of the laws, the provisions of Pa. Laws 1909, No. 261, p. 466, prohibiting the
killing of any wild bird or animal by any such foreign-born person except in
defense of person or property, and "to that end" making it unlawful for any
such person to own or be possessed of a shotgun or rifle.
DISTURBING A RELIGIOUS ASSEMBLAGE.
Brown z. State, Ga. App., 80 S. E. 26. Self-Defense. A statute prohibited the disturbance of a congregation of persons lawfully assembled for
divine worship, either during the service or so long as any portion of the congregation remained upon the ground. The defendant was upon the church
grounds during a protracted service searching the grounds for empty whiskey
bottles. As the congregation dispersed one of the worshippers, "apparently in
search of internal refreshment and comfort," asked the defendant if he "had
any of that whiskey." The defendant objected to the intimation that he was
engaged in the unlawful sale of liquor and threatened his'questioner, creating
quite a disturbance. The defense was that the accused was protecting himself
against the imputation of crime. Held that while possibly one charged with
crime of illegal liquor selling might be excused for resenting the words with
a blow, this rule cannot be applied when the insult is offered at a time and
a place when resentment would inevitably lead to the disturbance of a religious
assemblage, even though this rule deprives the person insulted of his only
opportunity for personal redress. The court distinguished this from an earlier
case in which it held that one who was feloniously assaulted might defend
himself even though to do so it was necessary to fire a pistol and in doing
so a congregation was thereby disturbed.
DYING DECLARATIONS.
Reeves v. State, Miss., 64 So. 836. Disqualified of Revengeful. In making
a dying declaration the deceased said that defendant murdered him and added,
"I hope the people will not let Barney walk around and not do nothing to
him after he have murdered me like he have." Held that the declaration shows
that at the time it was made the declarent was laboring under such strong
feeling of hatred and revenge against defendant as to remove all presumption
of its trustworthiness. Hence it was error to admit it in evidence, and the
conviction was reversed.
EM[BEZZLEMENT By ATTORiEY.

Price v. State, Okla. Cr. App., 137 Pac. 736 Not Admitted to Bar. Defendant was convicted of embezzlement under a statute providing for the
punishment of attorneys who receive clients' money or property in the course
of their professional employment and fail to pay it over. One defense was
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that the defendant had never been legally admitted to the practice of law in
the state. There was proof that he had been admitted to the bar of another
state, and as a matter of fact he held himself out to the public as a lawyer
'and did practice law in Oklahoma, appearing as an attorney in a number of
cases and accepting employment and receiving pay as an attorney in this case.
The court said that while it was illegal to act as an attorney without being
admitted1 to the bar, "the commission of one crime can never be pleaded as
atonement for the commission of another crime * * * if Price was attorney enough to accept employment to collect this money he is attorney eiough
to be punished for embezzling it." The conviction was affirmed.
ExECUTION.
Ex parte Lujan, N. M., 137 Pac. 587. After Void Stay. September 25,
1908, the petitioner was sentenced to imprisonment at. hard labor for two years.
The judgment further ordered that if the petitioner should forthwith remove
from the territory the committment should not issue so long as he remained
absent. He left the territory but later returned and July 17, 1913, the court
ordered a committment to issue because the condition of the stay-order had
been violated. The petitioner was taken into custody and applied for a writ
of habeas corpus. Held that the court had no power to stay the execution,
as there was then no statutory authority for so doing; that a sentence is not
satisfied until it has ben actually served, hence it was immaterial that a longer
period of time than that covered by the sentence had elapsed since it was imposed. Hence the committment under the sentence was legal. The petitioner
was remanded to custody.
FuGifIvE FROM JUSTICE.
Doren v. State., Ind., 104 N. E. 500. Right of Fugitive to Prosecute alz
Appeal. Where the defendant in a criminal case subsequent to his conviction
absents himself from the custody of the state and from its jurisdiction and
becomes a fugitive from justice, he cannot prosecute his appeal.
GAMING.

People v. Stein, 146 N. Y. Supp. 852. Slot Vending Machine. A machine
for dispensing gum, whereby a player in return for a penny inserted in the
slot receives one cent's worth of gum, and has a chance of receiving more
gum or candy, depending on the channel in which the penny falls, is a gambling
device which renders one who permits its operation in his place of business
guilty of keeping a room to be used for gambling contrary to Penal Law,
sec. 973, and who permits a boy under 16 to operate the machine guilty of
permitting him to be in a situation likely to impair his morals under sec. 483.
Ho ,IciDE.
Commonwealth v. Exler, Pa., 89 AtI. 958. Murder by Attempted Rape.
As used in act of March 31, 1860, -sec. 74, providing that a homicide committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate a rape shall constitute
murder in the first degree, the word "rape" is used in its common law sense,
and means unlawful carnal knowledge of a female without her consent, and
does not include statutory rape denounced in Act May 19, 1887, and there
could be no conviction under such statute for murder in an attempt to rape
a girl over 10 years old, without evidence of want of consent.
1
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INDICTMENT.

People v. Antoniello, 146 N. Y. Supp. 799. Sufficiency. An indictment,
accusing defendant of the crime of murder in the first degree committed as
follows, "the defendant, unlawfully, feloniously and of his malice aforethought struck deceased with a dirk, thereby inflicting injuries of which he
died," does not state facts sufficient to charge the defendant with the crime
of murder in the first degree as defined by Penal Laws, sec. 1044, since it fails
to allege that the injury was inflicted with intent to cause death, and that
intent can not be inferred from the fact that death ensued.
Castleberry v. State, Okla. Cr. Ap., 139 Pac. 132. Date of Crime. An
indictment charged that the crime was committed "on the day of May,
A. D., 1911." A statute provided that the precise time at which the offense
was committed need not be stated in the indictment. Another section provided
that the indictment should be sufficient if it showed that the offense was committed prior to the time of its filing, the offense was clearly and fully set
forth in ordinary and concise language and was stated with such a degree of
certainty that the court could pronounce judgment according to the right of the
case. Held that as the time was not a material ingredient in the offense
charged, the indictment was sufficient under the statute. The conviction was
affirmed.
INSTRUCTIONS.

Lanier v. State, Ga., 80 S. E. 5. Broader than Indictment. Defendant
was indicted for the murder of infant "by choking, strangling and by beating
and striking said baby boy." The trial judge instructed the jury that it would
make no difference to the guilt of defendant whether he or his wife actually
struck the blow or choked or smothered the child. The court held that on
this indictment the defendant could not be convicted on proof that the child
was killed in any manner substantially different from that charged. That "to
smother is to stifle, to suffocate by stopping the exterior air passages to the
lungs; to strangle is to suffocate by a pressure or constriction of the throat."
As the judge instructed the jury to convict if the child was smothered it
was prejudicial error. The conviction was reversed solely upon this ground;
two judges dissenting.
Remillard v. State, Okla. Cr. App., 137 Pac. 370. Presumption of Innocence.
On a prosecution for the illegal sale of liquor the court instructed the jury
"if you find from the evidence that he did not sell, or assist in the sale, or
give or otherwise furnish, or assist in giving or otherwise furnish the said
liquor to the said Glen Hall then you should acquit him." It was held that
this charge was contrary to the presumption of innocence because it required
the jury to believe from the evidence that he was innocent before they could
acquit him, while they should acquit him in case of a reasonable doubt, although they might not find from the evidence that he did not furnish the liquor.
People v. Terrell, II1., 104 N. E. 264. Credibility of Witness. In a criminal prosecution, an instruction that the credibility of witnesses is a question
exclusively for the jury, and that they have the right to determine from all
the surrounding circumstances appearing on the trial which witnesses are the
most worthy of belief, is improper, for the expression "circumstances appearing on the trial" might be taken by the jury to refer not to the evidence
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but to the conduct of the witnesses in the presence of the jury while they
were not on the witness stand. But the case being clear, held that the giving
of this instruction does not require a reversal of the judgment.
MURDER.

State v. Angelina, W. Va., 80 S. E. 141. Cause of Death. The defendant
inflicted a mortal wound on deceased. Within a minute or a minute and a
half thereafter deceased shot himself in the head inflicting a wound not necessarily fatal. In about twenty minutes from the first injury, deceased died. The
trial judge instructed that "if his death was not the result of the self-inflicted
wound but that, if it had any effect, only hastened his death, the result of said
mortal wound," the defendant was guilty- Also that if the defendant inflicted
a mortal wound he was guilty "provided the shot fired by him really contributed either mediately or immediately to the death" of deceased, even though
deceased "would have died from other causes or would not have died from the
shot fired by defendani had not other causes operated with it." The Appellate Court said "if after a mortal wound is inflicted by one person, another
independent responsible agent in no way connected in causal relation with the
first, intervenes and wrongfully inflicts another injury, the proximate cause of
the homicide, the latter and not the former is guilty of murder * * * the
rule is different where the agent so interposing is irresponsible." The court
called attention to the inconsistency in the instruction which presupposes a
mortal wound and says that the defendant wguld be guilty though the deceased would not have died from that wound had not other causes operated
with it, and says that it is further open to the same objection that if there
was a supervening responsible agency the defendant would not be guilty of
murder. It suggests that "the proper theory of the state's instruction should
have been a mortal wound by the defendant and that the self-inflicted injury
by deceased, though it may have been the proximate cause of death, was not
the-act of an intervening responsible agent but of one rendered irresponsible
by the wound inflicted by defendant and as the natural result of that wound
the causing cause of the immediate death of deceased." The conviction was
reversed because of these erroneous instructions.
The attention of the court does not seem to have been called to any prior
cases involving this point, especially People v. Lewis, 124 Cal. 551, 57 Pac.
470, 45 L. R. A. 783. In this case the facts were almost the same as in
the Angelina case, and the Supreme Court of California sustained the conviction upon the ground that the act of the deceased was a contributing cause to
the death, though not the sole cause. It is well settled that the act of the
deceased need not be the sole cause of death. Where a serious wound not
necessarily fatal in itself, is followed by blood-poisoning, causing death,
the courts are agreed that the man who inflicted the wound is criminally responsible for the death, for the reason stated by Lord Hale that he cannot
apportion the blame. There is a tendency on the part of our courts, illustrated by the Appellate Court in this case, to overlook the principle that the
defendant's act need not be the sole cause of death, where the intervening
act of a guilty agent also contributes to that result. It is, of course, well
settled that the person making the second attack is criminally liable if his
act shortens the life of deceased. It should not follow, however, that the
person making the first attack is immune from punishment, unless the second
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injury was the sole cause of death. If each of two wounds inflicted by two
person's acting independently hastens the death of the victim, there is no more
legal or logical reason for exempting the first assailant from responsibility
than for exempting the second. Their liability to punishment does not depend upon the chronological order in which they made the attack, but upon
whether the act of each did or did not shorten the life of deceased. The
trial court evidently had this principle in mind in giving the charge, and it is
submitted that the theory upon which this court acted is correct, and that upon
which the appellate court acted is not.
NON-SUPPORT OF MINOR CHILDREN.

State v. Bess, Utah, 137 Pac.'829. Destitution. The defendant's wife had
obtained a divorce, with the custody of four minor children. During the next
five months the defendant contributed only five dollars for the support of
these children. With great difficulty their mother provided the commonest
necessaries of life for herself and for them, by working in a knitting factory,
sewing, and acting as a nurse. There was evidence that the defendant could
have contributed more to their support. The defense was that the children
were not in "destitution and necessitous circumstances" as required by the
statute, because they were supported by their mother. Held that the fact that
the children were provided for by charity bestowed by relatives, friends, or
charitable institutions, would not protect the father from the punishment imposed by the statute for failure to support them. The cases of Poole v.
People, 24 Colo. 510, 52 Pac. 1025, 65 American St. Rep. 245; People v.
Malsch, 119 Mich. 112, 77 N. W. 638, 75 Am. St. Rep. 381; State v. Witham,
70 Wis. 473, 35 N. W. 934; Burton v. Commonwealth, 109 Va. 800, 63 S. E.
464; and State v. Waller, 90 Kan. 829, 136 Pac. 215 were cited and followed.
The cases of Baldwin v. State, 118 Ga. 328, 45 S. E. 399; Williams v. State,
126 Ga. 637, 55 S. E. 480; State v. Thornton, 232 Mo. 298, 134 S. W. 519, 32
L. R. A. (N. S.) 841, were overruled.
PARDON.

United States v. Burdick et al., 211 Fed. 492. Pardon Before Conviction
to Permit Testimony. The president has the power to grant a pardon, though
the person pardoned has never been charged or convicted of the offense.
Hence, where a witness declined to testify before the grand jury on the ground
that his testimony might incriminate him, and the president issued an unconditional pardon, the witness was thereby deprived of the- right to claim the
privilege, without reference to whether he accepted the pardon or not.
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.

Foster v. People, Colo., 139 Pac. 10. Circumstantial Against Direct Evidence. On a prosecution for larceny there was no direct evidence that the
defendant stole the goods. There was evidence that he left the stolen property
at a stable the morning after it was stolen, and that a roll of bedding found
with the property belonged to the defendant. There was evidence in behalf
of the defendant denying both of these statements and direct evidence to establish an alibi. The defendant was convicted. Held that the jury were
judges of the credibility of the witnesses, and as there was sufficient substantial testimony to support the verdict it would not be disturbed on appeal.
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TRIAL.

Rain v. State, Ariz., 137 Pat. 550. Other persons in Jury Room.. The
janitor and his assistant entered the jury room for the purpose of replenishing
the supply of ice-water while the room was occupied by the jury and conversed
with members of the jury. There was no evidence that this influenced their
verdict. Held that the modern presumption is that jurors are honest and regardful of the obligations of their oaths, hence the burden is on any person
charging dishonesty or corruption to produce evidence to support the charge.
Without such evidence the verdict will not be set aside. The conviction was
affirmed.
People v. Becker, N. Y., 104 N. E. 396. Misconduct of Trial Judge. During the trial of a -capital case, the court continually imposed on accused's
counsel, stated that he was becoming trivial, commanded him to sit down,
told him that he knew better than to make objections, objected to his manner,
which was in no way contumacious, refused to hear argument, unduly restricted the cross-examination of witnesses, and interposed objections of his
own, and on one occasion, when accused's leading counsel pleaded weariness
and asked that his associate might take his place in the cross-examination of
a witness, the request was summarily denied, and on another occasion it was
proposed as an apparent reason for denying counsel's request for an adjournment that the cross-examination be turned over to his associate. Eveiy appeal
to the court's discretion for an adjournment or for leave to re-open the examination of a witness to correct an inadvertent admission or utilize on crossexamination of a hostile witness newly acquired information or to call a witness who had been absent was denied, while applications of a similar character by the people were quite uniformily granted. At the close of the crossexamination of an important witness for the defense. accused's counsel requested permission to ask one question, but the court refused because "time is
too precious." At the close of the examination of another witness, accused's
counsel stated that he was too exhausted to conduct the cross-examination, to
which the court replied, "Let us have no more about exhaustion, we have
heard enough about that"; but after ascertaining that the district attorney had
no more witnesses, and both counsel pleaded for an adjournment, .the court
adjourned. Held that the court was guilty of prejudicial misconduct which
deprived accused of a fair trial.
STATUTE OF LImITATION.

People v. Di Paquale,146 N. Y. Supp. 523. Conviction of Lesser Degree.
In, view of Code Cr. Proc. Sec. 4, requiring a crime to be prosecuted by indictment, Pen. Code, Sec. 610, providing that, on trial of an indictment; there
may be a conviction of the crime charged therein, or of a lesser degree of it,
or of an attempt to commit it or a lesser degree, is a rule of pleading, merely
doing away with the necessity of charging in such an indictment the lesser
degree or attempt, and does not permit conviction under such an indictment,
of an attempt, where, when the indictment was found, the finding of an indictment for the attempt was barred by limitations.
TRIAL.

State v. Brand, Minn., -145 N. W. 39. Improper Argument. In an address
to the jury the county attorney made statements which went beyond the limits
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of legitimate argument. No objection was made or exception taken until the
end of the argument. Objection was then made to twelve statements, some of
which were justified by the evidence, and defendant requested a charge that
the jury disregard these remarks. This request was properly refused because
it was too broad. The court told the jury not to be governed by what counsel
on one side or the other said had or had not been proved but were to determine the facts from the evidence before them. There was no doubt as to
defendant's guilt. The court said that it was not apparent how the improper
language could have affected the result, and as the trial court had not deemed
it of sufficient importance to disturb the verdict it was not prejudicial error.
The order denying a new trial was affirmed.
REFORM IN COURT SENTENCES.

Some time ago I wrote of a judge who sentenced a man to live and work
on a farm until he should have paid the amount of his defalcation and made
his remaining out of saloons and maintaining total abstinence the conditions
of his probation.
I thoroughly believe-in such a reform in sentences and think there should
be more of this sensible method of dealing with defaulters, embezzlers, etc.
We read some time ago of a judge sentencing a man to support the widow
of the man he murdered, and as the provocation antI circumstances would
fully permit of it the plan must commend itself to us as being very practical.
Now we have another California decision along this line that I feel is
worthy of consideration. Judge White of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
has sentenced a prize fighter and his trainer to three years in jail and the
payment by each of a fine of $50.00 for assaulting a policeman on the street.
Judge vrhite suspended sentence and granted probation to the men on
condition that the $1,000.00 fines should be paid and that the prisoners while
on probation should (1) not drink any intoxicants; (2) not engage in controversies; (3) not enter any saloons; (4) not go to places where they are
likely to be tempted to break their probation; (5) that they should not stay
out all night at any time within the term of their three years' probation.
This seems rather drastic for prize fighters. If it provided also for them to
work during the term of their probation it would commend itself as more
sensible, and as a distinct improvement over a jail sentence.
WILLIAM I. DAY, Supt., California Prison Commission.

